Deck
Nu Holdings · NU · NYSE
Nu Holdings runs Latin America's largest digital bank with 135M customers across Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, earning a spread between near-zero-cost mobile deposits and a $32.7B mostly-unsecured consumer credit book.
$12.18
Price (May 15, 2026)
$60B
Market cap
$11.2B
Revenue (FY25, +27%)
135M
Customers
Listed Dec 2021 at $10.33; crashed to $3.43 by mid-2022 on the EM rate shock; compounded back to $18.83 in Jan 2026; sits at $12.18 after a 35% drawdown.
2 · Why this multiple exists
Same ROE as the incumbent leader on half the leverage — that math is the entire bull case.
30.3%
ROE FY25
Itaú 21.0%
4.58%
Implied ROA
vs Itaú 1.47%
17.6%
Efficiency ratio Q1'26
incumbents 40–50%
88%
Deposit cost % of CDI
on $42B base
Two measurable edges do the work. A cloud-native cost base serves 14,314 customers per employee against ~1,234 at incumbents. A 100%-organic deposit franchise funds the book ~12 percentage points below where a wholesale issuer would pay — roughly $760M of annualized funding advantage on $42B of deposits at Selic 15%, before any loan is underwritten. Net result: Nu earns 2.7× Itaú's return per asset dollar on half the balance-sheet leverage.
3 · The tension
Roughly a third of 30% ROE is rented from a 15% Selic — and Q1'26 was the first whisper of stress.
- NIM compressed, NPLs ticked up. Risk-adjusted NIM stepped from 10.5% to 9.5% in Q1'26 and 15–90-day NPLs jumped 89bps to 5.0%. Management called it Q1 seasonality plus "intentional risk expansion" via the NuFormer model; the tape priced it as the leading edge of a credit cycle and the stock printed -11.5% the next day.
- The funding moat is a percentage, not a dollar. The 88%-of-CDI edge produces ~$760M annualized at Selic 15%. The BCB path points to 9–11% over 2026–2028; the same percentage on a lower base rate halves the absolute funding edge — even before any drift to 92%+ as Open Finance enables deposit portability.
- A $32.7B unsecured book has never seen a recession at this scale. 92% of the credit portfolio is credit card + unsecured personal loans. A 100bps move in NPL 90+ on $32B equals roughly $320M of new ECL — about 11% of FY25 net income. Brazil's 2022–23 sector card NPL 90+ peaked above 14% on a smaller base.
ROE direction matters less than whether ARPAC keeps rising while cost of risk stays stable. That is the single quarterly question.
4 · Where we disagree with consensus
Consensus FY26 EPS of $0.89 silently anchors on a tax rate that cannot persist.
- The EPS denominator is wrong. Q1'26 ETR printed 8.7% on a one-time interest-on-equity benefit; the Brazilian fintech statutory rate is stepping from ~40% to 45% in 2026. At a structural 22–27% ETR the same pre-tax base produces $0.70–0.75 of EPS — and the $19.50 sell-side target sits on a 26× forward multiple, not the 17× consensus advertises.
- The marginal seller is forced flow, not a bear. Short interest sits at 2.9% of float at 3.4 days to cover after a 35% drawdown. That fingerprint is LatAm/EM redemption rotation, not a directional credit-cycle short. A clean Q2 print would have to clear without help from short-cover demand.
- Mexico and the US charter are priced at zero. Mexico hit break-even Q1'26 at 15M customers; the OCC granted Nubank N.A. a conditional national bank charter on Jan 27. The stock fully unwound that rally inside eight weeks — leaving the second engine as unpaid optionality in the multiple.
5 · The umpire
Q2'26 in mid-August arbitrates the credit-cycle question without yet deciding the multiple.
- The trip-wire. NPL 15–90 falling back below 4.7% with risk-adjusted NIM holding at 9.5% invalidates the bear's credit-cycle read and re-validates through-cycle ROE durability. NPL 15–90 holding at 5.0% with NIM compressing toward 9.0% forces FY26 EPS cuts and a multiple reset.
- The October election adds tail risk. Brazil's general election (Oct 4) plus Haddad's proposed BCB mandate expansion plus the FGTS regulatory cliff make consumer-credit caps a top-tier 20-F risk for the first time. The tape now reads every Brasília policy headline as Nu-relevant.
- The disclosure machinery is thinning. The Q4'25 "Managerial P&L" framework runs on limited assurance only — not a full audit — and FY24/FY23 have not yet been re-presented. $243M of FY25 development spend was capitalized rather than expensed. None of this is fraud; it warrants a 100–200bps multiple haircut on a 7× tangible-book name.
6 · Bull & Bear
Lean long, wait for confirmation — the unit-economics edge is too clean to dismiss, but the next print owns the multiple.
- For. Implied 4.58% ROA at 6.6× leverage vs Itaú's 1.47% at 14.3× — not a number you fabricate. ARPAC tripled to $16/month in five years while cost-to-serve held flat at $0.80; cross-sell, not Selic spread, is doing the next leg of work.
- For. Deposits at 88% of CDI held the 78–91% band through a 2.2× scaling of the base from $19B to $42B. Mexico break-even, the OCC charter, and ex-BCB president Campos Neto's chairmanship of the US board are free options.
- Against. Q1'26's simultaneous NIM compression and NPL drift hit two load-bearing pillars at once on a $32.7B, 92%-unsecured book that has never been recession-tested. October Brazilian election sits dead ahead.
- Against. Founder controls 74% of votes on 19% economics, with veto rights hard-coded down to a 5% stake. Insiders sell — Vélez took $462M off the table in Aug 2025, Sequoia cut its 13G by 57% — and have never bought in the open market since IPO.
My view — the machine is structural, but conviction belongs to whichever side prints the next data point. Q2 NPL 15–90 below 4.7% with NIM holding flips the lean to buy; deposit cost above 92% of CDI for two consecutive quarters is the stop.
Watchlist to re-rate: Q2'26 NPL 15–90 + risk-adjusted NIM + effective tax rate (mid-August print); deposit cost as % of CDI through the first BCB cuts; FY25 20-F re-presentation of FY24/FY23 under the Managerial P&L framework.